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In September 2012, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 702
and Rule 403, agreed with the trial court’s exclusion of fMRI-based lie detection evidence in
the fraud case of United States v Semrau.
A scant month earlier, Judge Eric M. Johnson of the Maryland Sixth Judicial Circuit,
Montgomery County, had refused to admit potentially exculpatory fMRI lie detection evidence
in the murder trial of State v Gary Smith. Citing the Frye standard, Johnson wrote, “It is clear
to the Court that the use of fMRI to detect deception and verify truth in an individual’s brain
has not achieved general acceptance in the scientific community.”
While research on fMRI-based lie detection has continued, the general consensus in the
scientific community regarding its probative value remains the same. This brief explores why.

WHAT IS fMRI?
For more than a decade now, scientists have been exploring the potential of functional magnetic resonance imaging,
or fMRI, to assess increased activity in brain regions associated with the cognitive processes required for lying.
fMRI does not measure neural activity directly. Instead,
it measures small and variable changes in the ratio of
oxygenated to deoxygenated blood in the brain when a
particular task is performed or stimulus presented—the
so-called BOLD, or blood oxygen level-dependent, response. Firing neurons, like working muscles, require
oxygen; follow the trail of oxygenated hemoglobin, and
you find neural activity.

LIES, DAMNED LIES, AND BEING COOPERATIVE
The most fundamental question scientists raise when
reviewing fMRI lie detection research is this: Do these
experiments actually examine lies?

The typical experimental paradigm involves “instructed”
lies: a subject is given detailed instructions about how
and when to lie, then placed in a scanner. Does conscientiously following those instructions constitute lying? Many
researchers worry that the answer is no, rendering the
experimental results irrelevant.
A distinct but related question arises from the poorly
defined nature of the real-world lie. Two equally false
statements—“Of course I remember you” and “No, I
didn’t kill him”—may be as distinct neurally as they are
morally. Similarly, an often-repeated lie or one first told
many years ago might look markedly different from an
unpracticed or recent lie.
A statement based on faulty memory (“I never said that”)
may not trigger any neural activity associated with deception at all. There is some evidence to suggest that fMRI
scanning will detect the subject’s belief, even if that belief
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PERSPECTIVES
isn’t borne out by the objective truth. In a 2010 memory
experiment supported by the Research Network and conducted by neuroscientist Jesse Rissman and colleagues,
the brain activity observed when subjects recognized a
face was comparable to that observed when subjects
believed they had seen a face before but hadn’t.

PROBLEMS OF INFERENCE
It is impossible to infer a specific mental process solely on
the basis of brain activity in a particular region, or even in a
particular set of brain regions. A single brain region is often
involved in a number of mental processes, and a mental
process often involves multiple areas of the brain.
In 2014, neuroscientist Martha J. Farah and colleagues
published a meta-analysis of the fMRI-based lie detection
literature to date. Like the meta-analysis performed by
neuroscientist Shawn Christ and colleagues in 2009, the
study reveals both variability in the particular brain regions
activated across experiments and some notable consistency. The regions that consistently showed deception-related
activity were the ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, inferior parietal lobe, anterior insula, and medial
superior frontal cortex. Predictably, those regions are
activated during other cognitive processes, as well, in
particular, those processes that form part of what we call
“executive control,” e.g., planning, working memory (the
system that provides for temporary storage and manipulation of information), inhibitory control (the ability to
suppress actions and resist interference from irrelevant
stimuli), and attention. Even the instructed lie is cognitively complex: a subject must remember a set of circumstances, attend to stimuli that vary in their significance
or salience, decide to lie, suppress the truth, and choose
among relevant and plausible details.

CONFOUNDS:
DO WE KNOW WHAT WE’RE MEASURING?
Even if instructed lies are lies, and there is some common physiological ground shared by all lies, experimental
confounds in most of the studies to date make it impossible for researchers to know whether the neural activity
measured is associated with lying or with something else.
A 2008 experiment by neuroscientist Jonathan Hakun and
colleagues, for example, included the following finding:
Brain activation was observed whenever the target or
“lie” stimulus was presented, independent of whether the
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Variables that can prejudice results aren’t limited to those
inadvertently introduced in research studies. Blood flow
itself is influenced by a variety of factors independen
of neural activity, including age, vascular capacity, and
medication. The fMRI results offered in the Semrau case
included a confound likely to be unavoidable in civil or
criminal applications of the technology: the length of time
between the fMRI and the event in question. Relatively
little research has been done on how such variables as
subject fatigue, anxiety, fear, the presence of a perceived
threat, or practice affect fMRI results.
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The uninstructed lie
In contrast to nearly all other studies to date,
one fMRI data set shows brain activity during
genuine dishonesty—that is, dishonesty
related to a freely exercised choice to lie. It
was the result of an ingenious experiment
published in 2009 by neuroscientists Joshua
Greene and Joseph Paxton.
The pair asked participants to predict the
outcome of random computerized coin flips
while undergoing fMRI. The experiment was
presented as an inquiry into paranormal
ability to predict the future; the supposed
hypothesis was that predictive ability
improved when predictions were not made
public in advance and were associated
with financial gain or loss.

It was a cover story that both encouraged
participant honesty (to test the hypothesis
adequately required them to tell the truth)
and gave them the opportunity to lie (in
some trials, they believed they would be
self-reporting their success at prediction). In
reality, the study was an attempt to determine what makes people behave honestly
when they are confronted with an opportunity for dishonest gain.
Throughout a series of “opportunity” (the
“opportunity” being to lie) and “no
opportunity” trials, participants made their
predictions, believing them to be either
private or public, depending on the trial.
Researchers then classified the participants
as honest, dishonest, or ambiguous based
on the probability of their self-reported

COUNTERMEASURES:
DETECTING A LIAR AND A CHEAT
Another serious obstacle to using fMRI for lie detection
in the real world is that very little research exists on
countermeasures, actions taken to make test results
misleading or unusable. Moving during scanning or not
following instructions can ruin a test, but they’re also likely
to be spotted. More worrisome is whether unnoticeable
physical or mental strategies could nonetheless effectively
interfere with patterns of neural activity or signal strength.
One study that looked at countermeasures with respect
to fMRI lie detection, conducted by Giorgio Ganis and
colleagues in 2011, featured prominently in the Gary Smith
murder trial. Study participants were instructed to use a
series of covert actions, such as imperceptibly moving
a left index finger or left toe, just before pressing the
response button each time they saw irrelevant dates in a
series. In trials without the countermeasure, researchers
were able to detect deception with 100 percent accuracy.
When the countermeasure was employed, detection
accuracy fell to just 33 percent.
A 2015 study by Melina Uncapher and colleagues, this one
of memory, showed that participants could successfully
conceal or feign memory for faces. Interestingly, and some
might say discouragingly, the study showed that both the

percentage of wins in the opportunity trials.
Subsequent fMRI data analysis revealed that
increased activity in the prefrontal cortex—
anterior cingulate and dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices—was associated
with the decision to lie in the dishonest
group. Interestingly, an even greater increase
in prefrontal cortex activity in this group was
observed in connection with the decision to
refrain from lying. In other words, when
individuals who had shown themselves
willing to lie passed up the opportunity and
instead reported a loss, prefrontal cortical
activity was even higher than when they
lied. (Whether this increase is due to
considering deception, resisting temptation,
or something else is currently unknown.) In
the honest group, no significant effects were
observed when choosing not to lie.

magnitude of hippocampal activity—a region long known
to be important for memory—and distributed neural
patterns could be manipulated by retrieval strategies.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF VALIDITY
Many scientists argue that the conclusions drawn from
fMRI ”lie detection” experiments conducted to date are
only valid within the context of the experimental data.
	Group data might not be able to tell us what we
need to know about an individual. The holy grail of
lie detection is to distinguish truth from lie reliably at
the level of the individual subject and at the level of the
individual question. But most of the studies conducted
on deception to date focus on truth vs. lie differences
averaged over multiple subjects and trials.
	A sufficient amount of group-averaged data can indicate
that a certain pattern of neural activity is frequently
associated with a particular experimental condition.
However, they cannot tell us whether the pattern of
activation is not also common to other experimental
conditions (or mental processes). Nor, for the moment,
can they shed much light on whether fMRI can reliably detect lies at the level of the individual subject
or question. In his testimony during the Semrau trial,
Cephos Corporation CEO Steven Laken, who conducted the fMRI lie detection tests submitted as evidence,
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confirmed that they did not indicate whether Dr. Semrau
responded truthfully as to any specific question and that
it was “certainly possible” that Dr. Semrau was lying on
some of the particularly significant questions.
	Experimental conditions often poorly approximate
the real world. To date, fMRI studies have focused
on detecting lies about an event that just occurred.
The event often has no personal relevance and no
consequences. Real-world fMRI lie detection focuses
on events or facts that are likely to have occurred
months or even years before, are deeply relevant to
the subject, and have serious consequences. Little is
known about whether real-world and experimental
conditions yield similar results.
	The sensitivity and specificity of fMRI lie detection
have not been established. No diagnostic tool is
perfectly accurate. Antiviral software sometimes
detects threats that aren’t there; mammograms miss
tumors. The probative value of fMRI-based evidence
depends on knowing how many lies the tool misses
and how often it identifies the truth as a lie; few
research studies to date have reported such data.

PRINCIPLED OBJECTIONS
At present, many of the issues that concern the scientific
community with respect to the use of fMRI for lie detection are likely to be problematic for the legal community,
at least in most contexts. In fact, much of the existing
research on deception has no bearing on the question that
matters most to judges, lawyers, defendants, and juries,
i.e., “Can fMRI-based lie detection methods provide a
legally relevant answer to a specific question?”
Most scientists—including many who have reported
detecting lies in the laboratory with a high degree of
accuracy—agree that more and different research will
need to be conducted before fMRI-based lie detection
is ready for its day in court.

TO LEARN MORE
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Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a
Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States
Detecting Individual Memories through the Neural Decoding of Memory
States and Past Experience
Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons

	Findings may not be generalizable to other
populations. fMRI studies typically are conducted on
undergraduates and other healthy younger adults.
Even if we know that there is neural activity in particular
regions under the condition of lying when subjects are
younger and healthy—a matter of debate, as already
discussed—do we know anything at all about what to
expect from a woman of 70, or someone with a
mental illness?

Law and Neuroscience in the United States
To download these and other publications exploring the intersection of
law and neuroscience, please visit the MacArthur Research
Network on Law and Neuroscience, at www.lawneuro.org.
This brief is produced by the MacArthur Research Network on Law and
Neuroscience. Supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, the network addresses a focused set of closely-related
problems at the intersection of neuroscience and criminal justice:
1) investigating law-relevant mental states of, and decision-making
processes in, defendants, witnesses, jurors, and judges; 2) investigating
in adolescents the relationship between brain development and cognitive
capacities; and 3) assessing how best to draw inferences about
individuals from group-based neuroscientific data.
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